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the contractual relationship between the 
university and its students. 370 A.2d at 
1366. The court indicated, however, that 
bulletin listings of projected tuition in-
creases does not support finding a con-
tractual obligation. [d. This examination 
must be made in light of principles of con-
tract interpretation. 
This construction must be made with 
an eye to the circumstances and to the in-
tent of the parties. Terms of the document 
are to be given their common meaning. 
[d. at 1367. The court quoted from the 
RESTATMENT OF CONTRACTS §32 (1932): 
An offer must be so definite in its 
terms, or require such definite terms in 
the acceptance, that the promises and 
performances to be rendered by each 
party are reasonably certain. 
Viewing the language of the Bulletin as 
a whole, and with a reasonable view 
toward the language surrounding the 
remarks concerning tuition costs, the 
court stated that" [tl hese words expressed 
an expectancy by the University regarding 
future increases. This is not a promise 
susceptible of enforcement." 370 A.2d at 
1368. 
In essence, the court found that the 
university attempted to provide rational 
guidelines for tuition costs. It had not in-
tended to create an inflexible obligation 
on its part to maintain fixed tuition rates 
when the economic realities of operating a 
university medical school would defeat 
that attempt at price stability, and force 
the school to operate at a loss. Such an 
unknown economic variable did arrive on 
the scene when the federal government all 
but eliminated. its support for medi-
cal/health educational programs in Wash-
ington by a decrease in funding through 
the District of Columbia Medical and Den-
tal Manpower Act. 





by John Jeffrey Ross 
When tort law assigns to an institution 
liability for the injurious acts of an in-
diVidual, the role of the law of civil ac-
countability as social engineering 
becomes especially clear. An important 
legal concept which assists this function is 
the theory of respondeat superior, where 
an entity actually remote from the trans-
action resulting in injury is held responSi-
ble because the acting defendant is, or ap-
pears to be, the agent of the party 
ultimately liable. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
cently considered the liability of the 
remote principal founded on apparent 
agency, but in reversing a judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals, refused to 
assign responsibility beyond the immedi-
ate parties to the event. B.P. Oil Corpora-
tion v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 
554 (1977). 
Claude Mabe drove into a service sta-
tion because his car was low on fuel and 
water. He asked the attendant for water to 
fill the radiator, and the employee pro-
duced a can filled with a volatile liquid. 
When Mabe poured this into the hot 
radiator there was an explosion. Mabe was 
injured, and he sued. 
The gas station was adorned with Bri-
tish Petroleum insignia: uniforms, gas 
pumps, a station vehicle, and a large sign 
exhibiting the BP letters and colors. Mabe 
had entered the station because he " ... 
always buy[sl BP gasoline, always deal[sl 
with BP." 279 Md. at 636, 370 A.2d at 
557. He therefore decided to deal with BP 
in court too, and named the corporation 
as a defendant, claiming that the injuries 
"stemmed directly from the negligent and 
tortious conduct of the defendants and 
their agents ... " 279 Md. at 634, 370 
A.2d, at 556. 
The jury returned a verdict for Mabe. 
As consumers they were apparently con-
vinced that Mabe's reliance on the ample 
exhibition of BP insignia as indicative of 
good products and service meant that he 
thought he had entered a station under 
the competent direction of the defendant 
corporation. The trial court, however, en-
tered a judgment n.o.v., "finding 'no 
agency of any kind .... " 279 Md. at 634, 
370 A.2d at 556. The Court of Special 
Appeals reversed, finding there was agen-
cy by estoppel. Mabe v. B.P. Oil Corpora-
tion, 31 Md.App. 221, 356 A.2d 304 
(1976). (See The FORUM, Vol. VII, No. 
2, p. 26) 
After granting certiorari, the Court of 
Appeals examined two theories of action: 
actual and apparent agency. In consider-
ing the former, it found that the owner of 
the station, Faison, leased the premises 
from a third party, further leased the sta-
tion to B.P. which in turn, by a reciprocal 
agreement, leased it back to Faison. The 
rents between B.P. and Faison were con-
tingent on the amount of gasoline sold, 
payment for such fuel being the actual 
rental fee. Other facts dispositive of the 
actual agency theory were the lack of sal-
ary and commission from B.P., and ab-
sence of control by the corporation in the 
hiring and payment of the station's 
employees. lt was found that Faison con-
trolled the operation of the station and 
that B.P.'s role was limited to that of sell-
ing its products to Mabe (and only when 
he was able to pay for them). 
The court concluded that there was no 
direct control by B.P. over the operation 
of the station such as to indicate an actual 
agency relationship. 279 Md. at 643, 370 
A.2d at 560. See Keitz v. National Paving 
Co., 214 Md. 479, 134 A.2d 296 (1957). 
The law of agency by estoppel is ex-
pressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§267 (1958) as follows: 
One who represents that another is his 
servant or other agent and thereby 
causes a third person to rely upon the 
care or skill of such apparent agent is 
subject to liability to the third person 
for harm caused by the lack of care or 
skill of the one appearing to be a serv-
ant or other agent as if he were such. 
This reliance must be actual and on the 
part of the person injured. It is not suffi-
cient that third parties direct the injured 
based on their faith in the apparent agen-
cy. 279 Md. at 644, 370 A.2d at 561. 
In order for Mabe to recover, the record 
must show such reliance on his part: 
reliance on the skill of the apparent agent. 
It was insufficient to show attraction to 
the station merely because it offered Bri-
tish Petroleum products. 279 Md. at 647, 
370 A.2d at 562. 
After its examination of the record, the 
court concluded that such reliance on 
Mabe's part was lacking; he entered this 
station rather than others in the proxi-
mate area because it provided B.P. pro-
ducts. In its interpretation of the record, 
the court cited a number of cases which 
held that the presence of an oil company's 
insignia was insufficient to establish the 
agency relationship (Levine v. Standard 
Oil Co., 249 Miss. 651, 163 So.2d 750 
(1964) and that the corporation's repre-
sentations were limited to showing the 
presence of its products. See Sherman v. 
Texas Co., 340 Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d 
916 (1960). 
In reversing the Court of Special Ap-
peals and denying recovery, the court 
found Mabe's attraction to the station to 
constitute no more than choice of prod-
ucts. 279 Md. at 649, 370 A.2d at 564. 
Judge Levine dissented vigorously. He 
noted that the court of Special Appeals 
sitting en bane had found the other way 
with only one dissent. The implication 
was that the solution of the case turned on 
an interpretation of the record, and that 
the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to Mabe was sufficient to sup-
port the jury verdict. Mabe had stated at 
trial that he not only bought B.P. prod-
ucts, but that he always dealt with B.P. 
It is apparent that this case is solved by 
a point over which reasonable men differ, 
and that there is considerable justification 
for a new trial. Instead, we are left with a 
narrow view of vicarious liability in this 
area, with limits of responsibility closely 
drawn and tightly circumscribed. 
Trounced For 
An Ounce 
by John Jeffrey Ross 
Noting that the Eighth Amendment has 
generally been invoked to proscribe "bar-
barous methods of punishment," a federal 
judge recently called upon the flexible 
and dynamic nature of the Constitution to 
grant a petition for habeas corpus relief 
from two consecutive 20-year sentences. 
Davis v. Zahradniek, 432 F. Supp. 444 
(W.O. Va. 1977). 
Petitioner Davis had been incarcerated 
after convictions in a Virginia court for 
possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute and for its actual distribution. The 
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the 
convictions and the sentences and Davis 
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in 
the United States District Court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §2254. In addition to his 
Eighth Amendment claims, Davis con-
tended: that he was denied a trial by an 
impartial jury; that he was subjected to an 
illegal search and seizure; that the 
government failed to prove possession of 
marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the state failed to show that the 
substance involved was illegal contraband 
under the Virginia statute. 432 F.Supp. at 
446-447. 
The District Court rejected any argu-
ments alleging error in the conduct of the 
trial, and the case turned solely on the 
Eighth Amendment claim that the 20-
year sentence (plus a $20,000 fine) was 
constitutionally offensive in light of the 
nature of the offense. 
After considering whether the length of 
a sentence can serve as a basis for "habeas 
relief," the court indicated that the dis-
proportionality of the sentence in rela-
tionship to the offense constitutes ex-
cessiveness which is the "hallmark of 
cruel and unusual punishment." 432 
F.Supp. at 450. 
In granting the petition, the court con-
sidered four elements in its constitutional 
examination of the sentence. First con-
sidered was the nature of the offense. The 
fact that the amount of marijuana was less 
than nine ounces and the absence of any 
aspect of violence in the offense were cru-
cial to the disposition of this petition. 
Regarding the second factor, the legis-
lative purpose behind the punishment, it 
was eminently clear to the court that the 
legislative frustration of the sale of a ques-
tionably harmful drug could be served by 
a less severe punishment. 
Third, after an examination of punish-
ment for the same offense in other juris-
dictions, the court noted the relative ex-
cessiveness of the Virginia sentence. 
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